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Democracy and expertise are seemingly well compatible with each other—since both are 
basic expectations against present political systems—but taking a closer look at them, we can 
see that they pose, in a sense, opposite requirements: while democracy presupposes a kind of 
equality, in the case of expertise some degree of inequality is unavoidable. Thus, if one wants 
to enforce the requirements of both democratic participation and expertise based decision 
making, these will likely clash with each other.  
This does not mean, however, that the conflict between democracy and expertise is a 
key topic in the literature of theory of democracy. This relationship was mostly either not 
problematized or it seemed unproblematic to reconcile them. My thesis is, however, that in 
the second half of the 20
th
 century, the problem of democracy and expertise appears in several 
actual political questions explicitly or implicitly. 
In this paper I analyze the conflicts between democratic authorization and expertise. 
First I sketch a model of democracy which can be used for this purpose. Then I discuss the 
requirements that should be fulfilled for a peaceful coexistence of democracy and expertise. 
Third, I analyze the processes which result or can result in a conflict between the two. 
 
Real existing democracy 
 
To discuss the relationship between democracy and expertise, we need a concept of 
democracy. But when defining democracy, we face the problem of what kind of normative 
requirements we use. Both too much idealism and too much opportunism could result in an 
unusable concept. For the purpose of this paper, too idealist criteria would not be suitable 
because I endeavor to study the relationship between democracy and expertise in present 
democratic systems; thus, it is presupposed that there exist feasible criteria of democracy. On 
the other hand, I discuss the conflicts between the two concepts, and if democracy were 
defined in a too opportunistic way, it would be hard to speak about the conflict between 
democratic criteria and expertise. 
I use a definition of democracy which is similar to Philippe C. Schmitter’s concept of 
“Real Existing Democracy” (Scmitter 2011).2 Schmitter relates his concept to Robert Dahl, 
and my criteria are also akin to Dahl’s approach. Of course, the following definition does not 
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 Real Existing Democracy in Schmitter has thee characteristics: „(1) it calls itself democratic; (2) it is 
recognized by other self-proclaimed democracies as being ’one of them’, and (3) most political scientists 
applying standard procedural criteria would code it as democratic.” (Schmitter 2011: 399) 
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claim to be a universal one, but it is set in accordance with the aims of this study. I use the 
following points to characterize democracy. 
 
 First, by democracy I mean representative democracy. This is a controversial point, 
because participative democracy is often regarded as a better form, and thus representation 
would be only a provisional solution. In present political systems, however, representative 
democracy seems to be indispensable; therefore, if our aim is to characterize real existing 
democracy, we have to take it as starting point. Of course, it is usually supplemented by 
the institution of referendum. 
 Basic requirements are the universal and equal suffrage and secret ballots, and the 
periodical elections.  
 Also a basic point is the alternatives which can be voted. It is widely held that forming 
alternatives and putting them on the agenda are nowadays not a bottom-up process 
initiated by the voters, but they are created by parties or other influential organizations, of 
course, continually scanning the preferences of the voters.
3
 This statement is, however, 
too close to the opportunistic side and needs some supplement. A suitable solution can be 
Dahl’s criteria of the openness of alternatives scheduled: “Any member who perceives a 
set of alternatives, at least one of which he regards as preferable to any of the alternatives 
scheduled, can insert his preferred alternative(s) among those scheduled for voting.” (Dahl 
2006: 70) Of course, there raises the question of how a simple citizen can succeed in 
scheduling a new alternative. Anyway, there is a chance to insert a new alternative among 
those scheduled by the parties, for example, by civil movements, establishing a new party, 
or by initiating a referendum. 
 It is also important that the voters know what program the parties endeavor to realize in 
case of winning the election. There are theoretical debates about the concreteness of the 
program of which realization the voters authorize the parties. However, it can be said that 
a degree of knowledge about it is required, and it is an unreal assumption that the winner 
is authorized with a blank check. 
 Next question is what relationship exists between citizens and representatives, parties or 
government. The most important is here what kind a control citizens have over 
representatives. The recall of elected representatives is very rare; the citizen’s control is 
thus usually restricted to the periodical elections. If so, the transparency of the governance 
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 Dahl, for example, speaks of alternatives scheduled, leaving the question open, who has scheduled it 
(Dahl 2006: 67ff.). 
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is needed for the citizens to be able to judge the performance of the government.
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Transparency, thus, can be regarded as a basic requirement of present democracies. It is 
not only a theoretical assumption but usually part of the national and international law. 
 In the light of these requirements, the first criterion, that is, the equality of voting rights, 
needs some supplement. Citizens can be regarded as equal if they have equal chances to 
get the information needed for the fulfillment of these requirements. For example, they 
can equally judge whether there exists any further, better alternative besides the scheduled 
ones, what can be the consequences of the party programs, and they must equally be able 
to judge the performance of the government. 
 
All of these are not meant to be a complete set of criteria. To qualify democracies we should 
include further requirements. But I think these points roughly describe the normative 
requirements of present democracies and are thus suitable for our research aim. On the one 
hand, they do not consist of unrealizable requirements; on the other hand, they cannot be 
regarded solely as description of the status quo, since one can find claims or criticism based 
on them. 
 
Democracy and expertise: a peaceful coexistence 
 
Although the topic of my paper is the conflict between democracy and expertise, and I argue 
that this is one of the most important challenges for democracy today, the literature on 
democracy usually does not thematize this question (Turner 2003: 2). It is evident, however, 
that expertise plays a crucial role in modern societies. It is thus worth first to examine what 
requirements must be fulfilled to avoid the conflict between democracy and expertise, while 
both are basic factors in present society. 
The first condition is that political and scientific questions must be clearly separable; 
that is, the debates based on interests or values and the territory of objective truth must be 
separated from each other. This separation is, on the one hand, an epistemological question: 
one holds that some questions can be solved objectively, and these questions constitute the 
object of science. We need, however, more than this: not only the objective and subjective 
terrains must be separable, but the activities, professions connecting to them have to 
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 It is usually distinguished between mandate and accountability theory. According to the first voters 
authorize representatives to execute a concrete program, while according to the second politicians act freely, and 
they will be judged by the voters on the next election (Manin et al. 1999, Körösényi–Sebők 2012). Here we do 
not need to decide this dilemma, since the requirement of transparency is necessary for both models. 
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differentiate from each other. For example, scientists do not manipulate—intentionally or 
not—their research results, and politicians do not influence research projects and their 
publication. 
The second condition connects to the elections. According to the above democracy-
model, during the elections citizens vote candidates or parties whose programs are the closest 
to their preferences. To do this, however, they need a kind of competence; that is, they have to 
be able to judge what effects party programs may have. To get such competence, it is 
necessary for the citizens to rely on experts’ knowledge.5 And these expert advices, again, 
must be objective and impartial.  
According to the above model of democracy, citizen competence is needed to judge 
the performance of the government as well. For example they must be able to decide whether 
the government has chosen the best tool to reach its aims, or whether the failure is attributable 
to the government or to external factors.  To judge these questions, citizens also have to rely 
on expert knowledge. 
To sum up, if we accept the above—both realistic and normative—model of 
democracy, and also accept that in modern society special expert knowledge is needed to 
judge several political questions, than there is a need for a kind of division of labor between 
experts and citizens: both of them do their own business, that is, citizens vote, experts gather 
knowledge and disseminate it, while their activities are interdependent, as far as citizens need 
expert knowledge to judge rightly, and experts—among other things—help to realize policies 
chosen by citizens.
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Blurring borders 
 
Defining epochs in the history of democracy and expertise is a dangerous endeavor because it 
can easily be oversimplifying. I think, however, we can put forward the view that from the 
beginning of modernity to the 20
th
 century, scientific and political questions were mainly 
separated, and that the two terrains co-existed relatively harmoniously. The Enlightenment’s 
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 According to the prevailing solution—says Dahl—citizen competence stems from more source, i.e. 
education, media, and information provided by the parties (Dahl 1992: 48). He does not mention expertise, but 
all sources have to be based on it more or less. 
6
 The idea of division of labor stems from Dewey. His thought can be regarded as the first formulation 
of the problem of democracy and expertise. His polemic with Walter Lippmann is one of the most important 
reference points in this topic even today (Brown 2009: 135). According to Dewey the solution to the problem of 
democracy and expertise is the division of labor between them: scientists define the basic social needs and 
problems, while citizen choose a solution among them in a democratic process. Of course, further requirements 
must be fulfilled to achieve this (Fischer 2000: 7).  
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ideal of science and progress regarded the scientists’ profession as an activity that is objective, 
free from political interests, and contributes to the progress of society. According to Anthony 
Giddens, modernity is based on trust in science and expertise (Giddens 1991: 88 ff., cited by 
Stilgoe et al. 2006: 20). Politics relied on the performance of science, which helped to develop 
a lot of institutions and services of modern state. The state—to a more or less extent—
financed and organized scientific research. This, however, was not a political control over 
science; scientist did not depend on politicians; science—in spite of the often relevant 
financial support—was independent (Nowotny 2000: 7–11; Fischer 2009: 18–20). 
This situation changed in the second half of the 20
th
 century, which change was 
attributable to more, probably interdependent factors. The first aspect of this change is that the 
clear separability of the two terrains—politics and science, or subjective judgment and 
objective knowledge—has become questionable. There are a lot of works in philosophy of 
science or sociology of science that contest the objectivity of science, and claim that scientific 
theories and their acceptance is partly attributable to social factors. The first important 
reference point is here Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revoluntions in 1962 
(Kuhn 1970, comp. Schudson 2006: 493). There are a lot of approaches belonging to this 
trend, for example, constructivism, strong program of sociology of knowledge, sociology of 
scientific knowledge, postmodern, or science, technology and society studies. The great 
number of the new schools does not mean that this approach is the mainstream of philosophy 
of science. A lot of scientists criticize them for relativism or for depriving science of 
objectivity. The sharpest manifestation of this debate was the Science Wars in the nineties. 
Independently of the result of this debate, what is interesting here is that the universal, 
objective, value-neutral, and context-independent ideal of science has lost its stability, and the 
authority of science or experts has been remarkably eroded. It is common that we hear 
criticisms from politicians, from the public, or from other experts that certain expert opinions 
or scientific results are not well grounded, intentionally distorted, or false owing to the 
narrow-minded methodology. This kind of contesting expert opinions is almost regular in 
questions like financial crises, ecological problems, or epidemics. 
Besides these relativist tendencies in philosophy of science or sociology of science, 
other factors have also contributed to the loss of authority of science and expertise. First of 
all, the belief that science has clearly positive effects was questioned. In the second half of the 
20
th
 century, there was a growing criticism against modern science, claiming that scientific 
activities have harmful or catastrophic effects. As a consequence, scientist lost their respect: 
they were not regarded any more as persons working exclusively for the progress of society. 
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But not only threatening catastrophes can erode the authority of science. The fact that 
political questions have been much more complex may in itself result in questioning of expert 
opinions. In the case of clear and simple questions, it is much more probable that after 
debating the opinions one of them wins, and thus we can speak of truth. Most of present 
political questions are, however, so complex that one can always argue for the opposite 
standpoint, and one can always find reputable experts in all opposed camps. In the public this 
can lead to the erosion of expertise: if there is no scientific consensus on a question, the 
standpoints of experts are influenced by other, non-scientific factors—may the people think. It 
is probable that when the problems are complex and the uncertainty surrounding them is 
higher, the border between science and politics becomes vaguer, because experts cannot 
answer these questions without any doubt (Carolan 2006: 663). 
 
Conflicts between democracy and expertise 
 
In what follows I examine what kind conflicts emerge or may emerge between democracy and 
expertise in the light of the social and scientific changes outlined above.  
The first problem is that today it is hard to define what falls within the competence of 
politics, that is, what questions should be solved by democratic decision making. Previously 
politicians did not want to intervene in the functioning of science, mainly because the 
performance of science was regarded as beneficial. But if science is seen as having harmful 
and perhaps catastrophic effects, there emerges the claim to intervene in scientific research. If 
certain technologies—e.g., nuclear technology or genetics—affect or threaten the life of 
citizens, then according to democratic self-determination, it seems to be a just claim to control 
them. As a result several technologies are prohibited or restricted. But on the other hand, it is 
also often said that a populist attitude hides behind these prohibitions: decision makers 
endeavor to serve the misguided crowd. People should only be enlightened and understand 
technologies, and they would not demand these prohibitions. Thus, a conflict between 
democracy and expertise emerges: different results would follow from democratic decision 
making and expert advice. 
Another problematic point is the delegation of power to expert committees, that is, 
when a public policy task is not executed by the government itself but by an expert 
committee, which is created by the government but usually functions independently of it. 
Delegation means that certain policy issues or whole policy areas are transferred from the 
competence of government to the competence of experts, that is, a kind of de-politicization. 
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On the one hand, there are criticisms stating that delegation is non-effective and anti-
democratic (Schoenbrod 2005); on the other hand, delegation in some cases seems to be 
unavoidable.  
The next conflict between democracy and expertise stems from the representative 
character of democratic government. Since in representative democracy the election is nearly 
the only occasion when citizens can influence the course of politics, it is important that they 
can choose among every possible alternative. As we have noted above, the normative 
requirement ensuring this is the openness of alternatives, that is, there is nothing to prevent 
scheduling a new alternative. There are, however, tendencies against this. On the one hand, 
because of the growing complexity of political questions, it is harder and harder to say that all 
possible alternatives are scheduled. On the other hand, because of the mentioned loss of 
authority of experts, people do not trust in experts defining possible alternatives. As a result, 
citizens often think that the alternatives scheduled are selected ones. And not the selection 
itself is the main problem—because it is probably inevitable—but who selects. Not only in the 
public opinion but also in scientific literature one can find views that scheduled alternatives 
are selected by political, economic, or scientific elites. For example, Herbert Marcuse and the 
early Habermas regarded science as a tool to serve the interest of capitalists: the scientific-
technical worldview, under the mask of objectivity, reduces the alternatives and eliminates the 
anti-capitalist ones (Marcuse 1991; Habermas 1969, 1973). 
But not only such radical views state that science reduces the alternatives. Peter Hall, 
applying Kuhn’s concept of paradigm to describe economic policy, speaks of policy 
paradigms. A main character of these paradigms is that they reduce the range of accepted 
economic policy tools, while their emergence and stabilization were not only influenced by 
scientific factors, but by social ones as well (Hall 1993). 
And the last point I discuss refers to the process of policy making. In democracy, one 
can find a democratically elected government, which—let us suppose—has won its mandate 
in an informative campaign, that is, the voters knew what program they vote. Thus, the 
government feels itself entitled to execute its program, and later, in the next election, the 
citizens will judge its performance. But this policy making won’t be undisturbed. Not only the 
opposition will monitor and criticize its decision, but a lot of other actors, like civil 
organizations, national and international experts with great reputation. These experts, as 
opposed to the government, do not have any democratic authorization, although they often 
seem to be right. 
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This case is different from the ones discussed above: while expertise was there a factor 
restricting or threatening democratic self-governance, here expertise is a factor that may help 
to correct a governmental policy, which may be based on an error or disinforming the voters. 
The continuous monitoring can thus mean an expansion of democracy, a correction of 
representative democracy. John Kean regards monitory democracy as a new epoch of 
democracy (after assembly and representative democracy), where a lot of actors, like civil 
organizations, journalists, experts, or bloggers continuously monitor and evaluate the 
performance of the government (Keane 2009, 2011). 
 
Summary 
 
The conflicts described above are not only theoretical ones, but one can find them in everyday 
political life as well. These conflicts, however, often emerge as conflicts between 
representative and participatory democracy. In general, the urging of participative and 
deliberative elements is a key component of present discussion or criticism of democracy. My 
argument is that some of the present problems of democracy can be interpreted as conflicts 
between democracy and expertise, and by so doing, these problems take a different form than 
in the case of participatory claims. There are approaches emphasizing that the next step or 
development of democracy will not or should not be participation but something different. 
One them is John Keane’s already mentioned concept of monitory democracy, which, he 
emphasizes, is not equal to participation. Keane does not emphasize the importance of 
expertise, but we can add: the more expertise based the monitory activities are, the more 
legitimacy they may gain. Another example is the so-called “third wave of science studies”. 
Harry Collins and Robert Evans distinguish between three waves of science studies. The first 
was based on the authority of science; the second eroded and questioned this authority by 
participative efforts. This second wave, however, generated a new problem: we do not know 
when we need expertise. The third wave endeavors to solve this problem; that is, it brings 
back expertise against participatory tendencies (Collins and Evans 2002). Of course, on the 
basis of these examples one cannot state that the key concept of democracy theory is expertise 
instead of participation, but a trend towards the growing importance of expertise and toward 
the correction of simple participatory claims perhaps can be observed. 
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